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Policy Matters But How?
Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU
Tanja A. Börzel, Tobias Hofmann and Diana Panke
Abstract
The European Union’s infringement procedure is highly legalized. Nevertheless, as in other international 
institutions, non-compliance occurs on a regular basis and its transformation into compliance varies across 
EU infringement stages and over time. State of the art compliance literature focuses mainly on country-
specific explanations, such as power, capacity, and legitimacy. In particular power-capacity models explain 
a good part of whether non-compliance occurs and how quickly it can be resolved. Yet, these approaches 
leave substantial parts of the empirical variation that we observe unexplained. This paper argues that 
policy and, in particular, rule-specific variables – although often neglected – are important for explaining 
non-compliance. Based on a quantitative analysis, we show that policy matters not only for the frequency 
with which EU law is violated, but also the persistence of non-compliance over time and over the different 
stages of the infringement procedure. 
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1.  Introduction
Non-compliance haunts all international institutions, as even highly legalized compliance monitoring, 
management, and enforcement settings cannot completely prevent rule violations.1 The infringement 
procedure of the European Union (EU) combines centralized compliance monitoring (the European 
Commission) with an elaborated procedure to resolve violations of EU Law. The European Commission 
opens infringement procedures for detected cases of suspected non-compliance and starts a managerial 
dialogue with the respective state. Should settlements fail, the Commission initiates the adjudication 
stage by referring the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which issues binding rulings. For 
the rather rare cases of highly persistent non-compliance, the Commission and the ECJ carry the case 
onwards to the enforcement stage, in which the ECJ can issue financial penalties (cf. Börzel 2001). Despite 
these institutional provisions, non-compliance occurs on a regular basis and includes all member states.2 
In addition, the transformation of norm violations into compliance varies across the stages of the EU 
compliance procedure and with respect to the time it takes to resolve infringement cases. Since the 
institutional design is constant, it cannot explain the empirical variance of member states non-compliance. 
The state of the art in non-compliance research focuses mainly on country-specific explanations (e.g. Knill 
1998; Haverland 2000; for an overview cf. Mitchell 1996; Checkel 2001). In particular, power-capacity 
models explain a good part of whether non-compliance occurs and how fast or through which compliance 
instruments it can be resolved (Börzel et al. 2010). Yet, all these approaches leave substantial parts of the 
observed variation unexplained. We argue that this is due to the compliance literature’s neglect of policy-
related explanations. Therefore, this paper focuses on policy-specific variables3, which we show to be of 
high importance for the frequency of non-compliance and its persistence over time and the stages of the 
infringement procedure. In addition, it shows that rule-specific variables, such as high European misfit, a 
high complexity of rules, as well as the idleness of European law transposition, significantly increase the 
frequency of norm violations.
The paper proceeds in the following steps. Firstly, we empirically assess the variation of non-compliance 
across policy fields (2). Subsequently, we develop policy-specific hypotheses and quantitatively test them 
(3). Variation in the frequency of compliance and its settlement dynamics between policy sectors cannot 
be completely captured by our policy explanations due to the heterogeneity of rules within policy fields. 
For example, while non-compliance cases from positive, market-correcting policy sectors seem to take 
longer to be settled – both in terms of stages of the infringement procedure and days – almost every 
policy field encompasses market-creating and market-correcting rules. Similarly, almost every regulative 
policy also encompasses redistributive effects. It can be difficult to aggregate them into distinct policy 
areas. To overcome these difficulties, we adopt an even more fine-grained approach. Next to policy-based 
hypotheses, we introduce rule-specific hypotheses and also test them with quantitative methods (4). 
1 Cf. Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott/Snidal 2000; Duina 1997; Garrett et al. 1998; Goldstein et al. 2000; Helfer/Slaughter 
1997; Hudec 1993; Joerges 2000; Kahler 2000; Keohane et al. 2000; Simmons 2000; Smith 2000; Stone Sweet/
Brunell 1997; Zangl 2001; Zürn/Joerges 2005 among others.
2  Cf. Duina 1997; Falkner et al. 2004; Falkner et al. 2005; Hartlapp 2007; Haverland 2000; Mbaye 2001; Mastenbroek 
2003; Steunenberg 2006; Treib 2003 among others.
3  For similar arguments in favor of an approach that does not ignore variation across policies cf. Lampinen/Uusikylä 
1998; König et al. 2005; Steunenberg 2007; Steunenberg/Rhinard 2005; Steunenberg/Kaeding 2008; Treutlein 
2007; Haverland 2000; Haverland et al. 2008.
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This reveals that when new Directives are based on existing European legislation, the misfit for member 
states is kept to a minimum and the probability of infringements becomes smaller. Likewise, increasing 
complexity of Directives goes hand in hand with a higher share of non-compliance. Finally, rule-specific 
idleness makes infringements more common. The paper concludes that policy-, rule-, and country-
specific explanations of non-compliance are not competing, but can be combined. In terms of country-
specific variables, high EU-specific political power and low bureaucratic capacities foster non-compliance 
(cf. Börzel et al. 2010). European misfit and complexity interact with capacities. High misfit between the 
new Directive and the European aquis communautaire as well as highly complex Directives require more 
political, administrative, financial, and cognitive resources than Directives that resemble or adapt already 
existing ones and Directives that are not as complex. Thus, states that struggle with capacity shortcomings 
face particularly difficult problems concerning the transposition and implementation of complex and 
original EU laws. 
2.  Non-Compliance and Policy-Variation 
While the European Union has successively expanded its legislative competencies, the implementation 
and enforcement of European law firmly rests within the responsibility of the member states. The 
European Commission has the right to bring legal action against member states it suspects to infringe on 
European law (based on Article 226 ECT). The infringement proceedings consist of several stages. The first 
two, suspected infringements (complaints, petitions, etc.) and Formal Letters, are informal and treated as 
confidential. The formal infringement proceedings start when the European Commission issues a Reasoned 
Opinion. Should non-compliance prevail after managerial dialogue, the European Commission refers cases 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This initiates the adjudication phase, which ends with a binding 
judgement. If the member states still refuse to comply, the Commission can open new proceedings (Art. 
228 ECT), which may result in a second ECJ judgment linked to financial penalties (cf. Börzel 2001).
When we map the frequency of non-compliance across policy fields between 1978 and 19994, we can see 
that all member states together infringe on European legislation in some policy areas more often than 
in others. Opened non-compliance cases (DV1)5 are not randomly distributed across policies.6 When we 
graph the annual number of Reasoned Opinions per legal act in a specific policy sector, we can see that in 
half of the policy sectors there are hardly any infringements (cf. Graph 1). However, in the enterprise (i.e. 
corporate law) sector, member states violate an average seven percent of the legal acts in force every year. 
Infringement numbers are also relatively high for environmental policies.7
4 For more information on the dataset, cf. Börzel et al. 2007.
5 For more information on the dataset, cf. Börzel et al. 2007. In this part of the paper, in which we focus on policy-
specific explanations of non-compliance, we distinguish between two types of dependent variables – DV1 and 
DV2a/b. The first dependent variable (DV1) measures the frequency at which non-compliance occurs. It is based 
on Reasoned Opinions, i.e. the first official stage for which the Commission publishes non-compliance data. The 
second dependent variable (DV2) measures the persistence of non-compliance. It further distinguishes between 
the duration of non-compliance over time (DV2a) and the number of stages of the infringement procedure it 
takes to settle specific infringement cases (DV2b).
6  The variance across policies is even larger than that between countries (cf. Börzel et al. 2007). 
7 The same holds true for the justice and home affairs policy sector. However, this sector was only introduced 
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Graph 1: DV1 – Annual Reasoned Opinions per Legal Act (in %) by Policy, 1978-998
If we look at the persistence of non-compliance (DV2) instead of the occurrence, we see a very different 
picture. While European legal acts in the enterprise sector are the ones most prone to be infringed on, 
the enterprise non-compliance cases are also the ones that are most rapidly settled on average. While 
non-compliance is usually transformed into compliance in less than two years in the areas of enterprise 
and education legislation, infringement proceedings in the fisheries policy sector tend to drag on for three 
years before they are successfully resolved. 
after the other policy sectors by the Maastricht Treaty in late 1993. Moreover, justice and home affairs has only 
subsequently been “communitarized” and made subject to Article 226 infringement proceedings. Therefore, we 
decided to exclude this policy sector from our analyses.
8 adm = Administration, agr = Agriculture, com = Competition, eco = Economic and financial affairs, edu = Educa-
tion and research, emp = Social affairs, ent = Enterprise, env = Environment, fis = Fisheries, sem = Single market, 
tax = Tax, ten = Transportation and Energy, and tra = Trade.
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Graph 2: DV2a – Average Duration of Non-compliance (in Days) by Policy, 1978-99
As there is a large positive correlation between the duration of non-compliance (DV2a) and the stages 
individual infringement cases reach (DV2b), it is not surprising that enterprise is the one policy sector that 
shows substantial variation across the stages of the infringement procedure. It starts out as the policy 
sector with the second largest number of infringements (not controlling for the number of legal acts in the 
policy sectors), but ends up in the middle field at the later stages (cf. Graph 3). Most of the other policy 
sectors stay compliance leaders or laggards across the stages. They might change their ranking within 
their respective group, but they do not substantially change their position. Agriculture, environment, and 
single market account for most infringements at all stages. By contrast, trade, economic and financial 
affairs, education and research, and competition feature very few infringements across the board. Overall, 
it seems that policy sector-specific non-compliance remains stable across the stages of the infringement 
procedure (Graph 3). 
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Graph 3: DV2b –Non-Compliance across Stages for Selected Policy Sectors, 1978-999
In order to inquire whether there is significant cross-policy variation beyond the graphical evidence, we 
analyze the effects of binary policy variables on the three variants of our dependent variable, i.e. DV1 
and DV2a/b. First, we look at the occurrence of non-compliance in different policy sectors with an OLS 
regression (Model 1, Table 1). In a second step, we try to answer the question whether the number of 
stages that individual infringements reach and how long it takes for infringement cases to be settled 
depends on the policy sectors that the infringed legal acts belong to. In order to provide a statistical 
answer, we use an ordered probit model (Model 2, Table 1) and a Cox proportional hazard model (Model 
3, Table 1). 
From  the models in Table 1 it becomes obvious that there is significant policy variation with respect to the 
occurrence of non-compliance. Three policy sectors – fisheries, tax, and trade – have significantly less and 
five have more Reasoned Opinions per legal act and year on average (in %) than the arbitrary reference 
category agricultural policy (cf. Model 1, Table 1). With respect to the numbers of stages of the infringement 
procedure, enterprise cases have the lowest probability of making it from one stage to another, fisheries 
cases the highest (cf. Model 2, Table 1). Duration-wise, only enterprise cases last significantly shorter 
than agricultural cases, which form the reference category. Also, disputes over compliance with European 
9 All sectors that make up less than 2 percent of the infringement cases across all stages of the EU’s official inf-
ringement procedure were excluded from this graph in the interest of clarity. In fact, not a single case from the 
economic and financial affairs, education and research, and trade sectors has made it to the fourth stage (ECJ 
Referral, Article 228) in the years 1978-99.
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fisheries legislation have the best chances for a long survival, i.e. to be dragged on for a significantly longer 
time than all the others (cf. Model 3, Table 1). 
Table 1: Policy Sectors and Infringements
Models: (1) (2) (3)
DV1 DV2a DV2b
Administration 0.0112
0.0555
0.3487**
0.1492
-0.5730***
0.1537
Competition -0.0031
0.0425
0.2150
0.1821
-0.3835***
0.1405
Economic & Financial 
Affairs
0.0278
0.0729
0.5151**
0.2312
-0.2014
0.1997
Education & Rresearch 0.8580***
0.1369
0.3444***
0.0772
-0.5411***
0.0662
Enterprise 6.8655***
0.7353
-0.2459***
0.0553
0.1051**
0.0471
Environment 3.6017***
0.4348
0.4077***
0.0528
-0.3579***
0.0479
Fisheries -0.0689*
0.0375
0.8810***
0.1806
-0.8927***
0.1183
Single Market 1.1717***
0.1127
0.1771***
0.0542
-0.4808***
0.0452
Tax -0.0582**
0.0234
0.4575***
0.0787
-0.5485***
0.0618
Transportation & Energy 0.4165***
0.1239
0.2055***
0.0757
-0.0890
0.0683
Trade -0.1581***
0.0199
0.2819
0.2455
-0.2524
0.1815
Constant 0.1676***
0.0195
Cut Point 1 0.6532***
0.0366
Cut Point 2 1.1998***
0.0384
Cut Point 3 2.2336***
0.0545
Time Dummies yes yes yes
Observations 273 5,462 4,591
Adjusted R-squared 0.74
Time at Risk 2,974,371
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Hubert/White) standard errors. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
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3.  Policy-Explanations 
In order to explain why certain policy fields are more often infringed upon and why cases from some fields, 
such as enterprise, are settled at the earlier stages of the compliance procedure and more rapidly than 
from others, this third section develops policy-field hypotheses on the occurrence of non-compliance 
(DV1) and its persistence (DV2), respectively. This is made somewhat difficult by the International Relations 
(IR) legacy of the existing compliance and implementation literature, which is strongly state-centered and 
hardly considers policy variables. However, there are exceptions. At least three prominent approaches 
highlight differences between regulative and non-regulative policies (Majone 1993), distributive and 
redistributive policies (Windhoff-Héritier 1980), and market-creating/negative and market-correcting/
positive policies (Zürn 1997). 
Majone argues that the costs of policy formulation and decision-making in regulatory policy sectors 
are relatively low at the European level, but often significant – in material and political terms – when it 
comes to the implementation of European legislation at the domestic level. Regulative policies are more 
prone to non-compliance than the non-regulative ones because the former usually come at higher costs, 
which the implementing authorities might be neither willing nor able to bear (Majone 1993). Windhoff-
Héritier (1980) focuses more on how policies differ in the extent to which they redistribute resources. 
States find it easier to comply with non-redistributive policies than with redistributive ones because their 
implementation faces less opposition at the domestic level. Unlike distributive policies, redistributive 
policies typically specify winners and losers (Wilson 1980). Some groups benefit from redistributive 
policies, while others have to pay for them. The latter groups – especially if they are well defined, small, 
and (therefore) not suffering from collective action problems (Olson 1965) – will fiercely try to prevent 
the implementation and resist the enforcement of redistributive European legislation, thereby increasing 
non-compliance. Third, legal acts from certain policy sectors might have a wider regulative scope than 
policies from other sectors, i.e. address more and broader issues. The logic behind this argument refers 
to the costs of implementation once again. Policy sectors, in which the EU has comprehensive legislative 
competencies (wide scope), are expected to come with higher costs and more infringements than policy 
sectors in which the EU can only legislate on selective or minor issues. The wider the scope, the more 
member states might be unwilling or unable to bear the costs that come with the implementation and 
enforcement of comprehensive and far reaching policies.10
Table 2: Policy-specific Hypotheses – Part 1
Regulative Redistributive Scope
If the better part of a policy sector 
is regulative, it will experience more 
non-compliance than non-regulative 
policy sectors.
If the better part of a policy sector 
is redistributive, it will experience 
more non-compliance than non-
redistributive policy sectors.
If the better part of a policy sector 
has a wide regulative scope, it will 
experience more non-compliance 
than policy sectors with a more 
narrow scope.
10 Somewhat similar to the scope is the concept of specializations (or the lack thereof), which is described by Steu-
nenberg/Kaeding 2008 as “the extent to which directives regulate rather technical issues, which are intended to 
be implemented uniformly by national administrations” (11). 
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Finally, Zürn argues that policy sectors vary in their affinity for non-compliance along a positive, market-
correcting versus negative, market-making dimension, with positive/market-correcting policies being the 
ones that are more likely to be infringed on (Zürn 1997; Börzel et al. 2003). The idea is that negative 
or market-making policies do not require member states to take action or develop and police the 
application of new legislation, but “only” to abstain from interfering with the free flow of market forces. 
By contrast, positive policies do not just aim at the elimination of distortions of competition in Europe, but 
explicitly require states to interfere and to take action (Scharpf 1999; Wallace 2005). The transposition 
and implementation of positive policies does not only come at a higher cost, but they also create more 
opportunities for member states to non-comply. However, Zürn’s argument does not stop there. In fact, 
he hypothesizes interaction effects between the type of policy and member states’ capacity on the one 
hand and policies and the phase of the transposition and implementation process on the other hand 
(Zürn 1997). More specifically, he suggests that European legal acts from a positive policy sector are 
particularly vulnerable to non-compliance (i) if member states lack government capacity, i.e. the financial 
endowment as well as the efficient bureaucracy that can mobilize and channel those resources into the 
compliance process, and (ii) when it comes to their practical application and enforcement rather than 
their legal transposition into national law. Elaborating on Zürn, we can also argue that not only a lack of 
government capacity, but also a lack of government autonomy should make compliance especially with 
positive policies more difficult for member states (cf. Börzel et al. 2003). In that context, government 
autonomy refers to institutional and partisan veto players (and is the higher, the lower the number of veto 
players is), which can block the implementation of international rules because of the costs they have to 
(co-) bear (Alesina/Rosenthal 1995; Haverland 2000; Tsebelis 2002; Linos 2007). Taken together, we end 
up with four additional policy-centered hypotheses, three of which are about interaction effects. These 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Policy-specific Hypotheses – Part 2
Positive Interactions
If the better part of a policy sector has a positive 
character, it will experience more non-compliance 
than negative policy sectors.
With decreasing levels of government capacity, the non-
compliance promoting effects of positive integration 
become more pronounced.
With decreasing levels of government autonomy, the non-
compliance promoting effects of positive integration 
become more pronounced. 
The non-compliance promoting effects of positive integration 
are more striking when it comes to the practical 
application and the enforcement of EU law than for its 
legal transposition.
All four theoretical accounts require a categorization of the policy fields. This is extremely difficult, since 
it is highly likely that every policy field, or in fact, every single European legal act entails both regulative 
and redistributive elements and some elements of market correction and of market creation, respectively. 
This is why previous studies have focused on analyzing policies which are straight forward in their 
categorization (Scharpf 1996, 1997; Zürn 1997, 2002). Yet, even on the level of individual policies, the 
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categorization along our four variables remains difficult. Surrendering to the methodological challenge 
might be tempting but would render the theoretical distinctions made by Scharpf empirically irrelevant. 
We claim that analyzing the general goals the EU aims to achieve within a certain policy area, its underlying 
problem-solving approach and the policy instruments mainly invoked to achieve these goals allows to 
determine the predominant character of a policy area. Our categorization is certainly not beyond criticism 
but provides a first cut into an important research area.
Table 4: Policy Sectors and their Characteristics
Concept: Regulative Redistributive Scope Positive
Administration
Agriculture X
Competition X X
Economic & Financial Affairs X
Education & Research X X
Social Affairs X X X X
Enterprise X X X
Environment X X X X
Fisheries X
Single Market X X
Tax X
Transport & Energy X X X
Trade X X
We find that only three policy areas actually have a predominantly market-correcting character, while 
all other policy areas either pursue mostly market-making goals, or both. The social policy of the EU has 
clearly market-correcting goals (Art. 136 ECT) since it aims at improving living and working conditions to 
protect workers’ health and safety. In a similar vein, environmental policy is designed to correct market 
failures by setting production and product standards to fight environmental pollution (Art. 174-176 ECT). 
Finally, while research policy aims at improving the competitiveness of European industries, it does so by 
invoking primarily market-correcting instruments, including financial and technical assistance (Art. 163 
ECT).
As for the regulatory scope of policy areas, we argue that it is widest in the areas of agriculture, 
environment, social affairs, and single market. These sectors regulate many diverse issues ranging e.g. 
from biotechnology to air quality in the environment sector and from gender-related issues to working 
hours and safety regulations in social affairs. Fisheries and tax, by contrast, cover only very few issues. 
Finally, in line with Majone’s description of the EU as a “regulatory state” (Majone 1997), many policy areas 
have been assigned a predominantly regulatory character. Exceptions are administration, agriculture and 
                                      Policy Matters But How?   | 15
fisheries policies. While the former does not seem to fall in any of the developed categories, agricultural 
policies have both redistributive and distributive policy goals and instruments and do not primarily aim 
at setting standards and prescribing behaviour. The same holds true for fisheries, which invokes, however, 
more redistributive instruments for protecting market participants than agricultural policy does. In 
a similar vein, social affairs, enterprise, environmental policy and transport and energy policies invoke 
measures with redistributive implications, but do so along with regulatory ones. 
Empirical Findings
Having discussed the policy-specific theoretical approaches to non-compliance and operationalization of 
our policy variables, it is time to turn to empirically test the derived hypotheses. It is important to notice 
that we need different datasets to test these hypotheses. To test the separate policy-specific hypotheses, 
we just need a dataset that has the policy year as its unit of analysis. This allows us to compare whether 
on average more Reasoned Opinions address infringements in regulative or non-regulative, redistributive 
or non-redistributive, etc. policy sectors. As the first two of Zürn’s interactive hypotheses make reference 
to policy- and member state-specific variables, we need a dataset that captures both of these aspects. 
The unit of analysis for Models 2 and 3 of Table 5 is the negative versus positive country year, i.e. for each 
country year there are two observations – one focusing on the non-compliance with negative policies and 
one on non-compliance with positive policies. Finally, to test the third of Zürn’s interactive hypotheses, we 
have to distinguish between non-compliance that occurs during the legal transposition phase and those 
cases that happen during practical application. The unit of analysis is not only the policy year as in Model 
1 of Table 5, but the legal transposition versus practical application and enforcement policy year.
Table 5 shows that the regulative scope of a policy sector might influence the frequency of non-compliance 
(cf. Model 5, Table 5), while neither Majone’s nor Windhoff-Héritier’s policy distinctions seem to matter 
when it comes to the question of compliance (cf. Models 1 and 5, Table 5). When we control for the 
member state-specific variables, there is some evidence for Zürn’s argument that positive policies might 
indeed follow a different logic of implementation than negative ones. There is a strong positive correlation 
between a policy sector’s market-correcting nature and a larger number of infringements on European 
law (cf. Models 2 and 3.Table 5). Also, the first of the two interactive capacity hypotheses is strongly 
supported (cf. Model 3, Table 5). While the number of veto players does not affect the relation between 
the characteristics of a policy sector and the number of infringements, effective bureaucracies do. The 
negative and significant interaction effect between the positive dummy and the government capacity 
indicator suggests that more capacity reduces the non-compliance promoting effects of positive policy 
sectors. This is perfectly in line with the respective interactive hypothesis.
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Table 5: Policy-specific Explanations of the Occurrence of Non-compliance11
Models: 1 2 3 4 5
Policy:
Regulative 1.4988
1.1350
0.0195
0.6936
Redistributive 2.1744
1.4292
0.7559
0.7116
Scope 0.8490
0.4823
0.9354**
0.4244
Positive -0.4298
1.4391
1.5845***
0.2078
1.2873***
0.1619
0.5909
0.9366
0.2608
1.0586
Phase:
Application -0.2455
0.6163
0.0072
0.6274
Power:
GDP 0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
Shapley S. Index 0.0341
0.0203
0.0341
0.0204
Capacity:
GDPpc -0.0037
0.0093
-0.0037
0.0093
Efficiency -0.4888***
0.0543
-0.1696*
0.0791
Constraints 0.7973
0.6483
0.4884
0.4500
Interaction Effects:
SSI * Efficiency 0.0127
0.0094
0.0127
0.0095
Pos. * Efficiency -0.6385***
0.1813
Pos. * Constraints 0.6177
1.2140
Pos. * Application -0.6650
0.9823
-0.9176
0.9624
Constant -1.0556
1.0696
-0.5695
0.6143
-0.4209
0.6143
0.5204
0.6068
-0.5652
0.4818
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 252
Policy Years
464
Negative 
vs. Positive 
County Years
464
Negative 
vs. Positive 
County Years
564
Transposition 
vs. application 
policy years
522
Transposition 
vs. application 
policy years
Adj. R-squared 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.00 0.12
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Hubert/White) standard errors with clustering on member states (Models 2 and 3) 
and policy sectors (Models 1, 4, and 5). *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
11 The operationalization of the power and capacity variables is explained in Appendix.
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Table 6: Policy-specific Explanations for the Persistence of Non-compliance
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Policy:
Positive 0.2969***
0.0770
0.2368***
0.0756
-0.2709***
0.0552
-0.2486***
0.0739
Power: 
GDP 0.0001*
0.0000
0.0001*
0.0000
-0.0000
0.0001
-0.0000
0.0001
Shapley S. Index 0.0033
0.0110
0.0038
0.0107
-0.0177**
0.0082
-0.0179**
0.0085
Capacity:
GDPpc 0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0000
0.0000
-0.0000
0.0000
Efficiency -0.2317***
0.0248
-0.2119***
0.0404
0.0585***
0.0196
0.0505
0.0359
Constraints 0.4530**
0.1973
0.4831*
0.2685
-0.3524
0.2184
-0.3306
0.2479
Interaction Effects:
SSI * Efficiency -0.0017
0.0060
-0.0016
0.0058
-0.0017
0.0052
-0.0018
0.0051
Positive * Efficiency -0.0808
0.0769
0.0307
0.0836
Pos. * Constraints -0.1583
0.7477
-0.1028
0.3447
Cut point 1 0.6701***
0.2211
0.6576***
0.2226
Cut point 2 1.2113***
0.2242
1.1989***
0.2253
Cut point 3 2.2244***
0.2410
2.2120***
0.2406
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,181 5,181 4,377 4,377
R-squared 0.0216 0.0217
Time at Risk 2,905,849 2,905,849
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Hubert/White) standard errors with clustering on member states (Models 2 and 3) 
and policy sectors (Models 1, 4, and 5). *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
We also test the policy-sectors hypotheses for the persistence of non-compliance (DV2). Here, we focus 
especially on the relative promising hypotheses on negative versus positive policies and the interactions 
between policy-centered and country-centered variables.12 For this, we use the same datasets we used for 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 1, but append them with a dummy variable that distinguishes between positive 
and negative policy sectors and the interactions between this variable and government autonomy and 
government capacity.
12 We also looked at the effect of the other policy variables (cf. Table 5) on the persistence and duration of non-
compliance, but did not find any significant effects. Therefore, we concentrated our testing efforts on the positive 
versus negative hypothesis in Table 6.
Number of Stages (DV2a)         Duration (DV2b) 
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Table 6 reveals that non-compliance from positive policy sectors take longer to be settled – both in terms of 
stages of the EU infringement procedure and days. For this effect, however, it seems to make no difference 
whether member states have effective bureaucracies and/or many domestic veto players. None of the 
two hypothesized interaction effects between government capacity, government autonomy, and policy 
sector type turn out to be significant.
Overall, the evidence for policy effects on non-compliance is mixed. However, this might be more due 
to the operationalization of the policy covariates than to the actual effects of policies. The problem is 
that all of the policy hypotheses start from the level of the individual legal act and aggregate up to the 
policy sector level. Obviously, this comes with problems as policy sectors are usually not homogenous, 
but feature variation along the different policy dimensions within themselves. While some environmental 
legal acts have regulative characteristics, others do not. Some social affairs regulations have a wide scope, 
others have a narrow one. Some legal acts in the policy sector enterprise follow a positive implementation 
logic, others a negative one. In order to tackle this problem, the next section focuses on the individual 
legal acts that make up the policy sectors.
4.  Rule-Specific Explanations
While compliance varies across policies, it is empirically extremely difficult to classify policy fields along 
analytical lines, such as negative versus positive or distributive versus non-distributive. For most policy 
sectors it is hard to tell whether their overall orientation is market-creating or correcting or regulative rather 
than redistributive. Since heterogeneity within policy sectors is the major problem for the development 
and testing of policy hypotheses, we turn our attention to single legal acts instead. We are interested 
in how the characteristics of specific legal acts affect their chances to be infringed on or complied with 
(DV1). 
At this point, we do not look at our second dependent variable, i.e. the time (DV2a) and the number 
of stages of the infringement procedure (DV2b) it takes for individual instances of non-compliance to 
be settled. While the necessary data for such an analysis is available to us, the analysis itself poses 
methodological challenges, which we do not tackle at this time. In essence, the problem is that – as we 
have shown in previous work on non-compliance and its prevalence (Börzel et al. under review) – the very 
factors that influence our dependent variable of interest (DV2) are also critical to the event in question, i.e. 
non-compliance. More precisely, the principal problem is sample selection bias. Substantively, we want to 
know whether country-, policy-, and rule-specific factors “help” to prolong the duration of infringement 
proceedings and make infringement cases reach later stages of the EU’s infringement procedure. However, 
the question whether we even observe the dependent variable of interest depends on the probability of 
selection, which itself depends on similar covariates. Both outcomes of the selection equation – compliance 
and non-compliance – are conditionally linked to our outcome of interest (duration or stages) through the 
variables that determine the duration or number of stages. Hence, to explain duration, the selection of 
non-compliance into the sample has to be explicitly addressed. However, the development of appropriate 
estimation techniques for probit and count data models at the first and survival and ordered probit models 
at the second stage is still in flux (Boehmke et al. 2006; Kachi 2007; Boehmke/Meissner 2008).
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Focusing exclusively on the first dependent variable, our rule-specific, empirical analysis still requires a 
new dataset that differs from the one we analyzed in section 3. We need compiled data on whether 
individual legal acts have been complied with by all, some, or none of the EU member states as well as 
data on corresponding characteristics (independent variables) for each of the legal acts in the database. As 
collecting information for all independent variables for the more than 10,000 European legal acts in force 
over the period 1978-99 is beyond the scope of this paper, we focus on the year 1993 and information on 
all 118 EU Directives that came into force in that year. This 1993 subset is a representative sample of the 
larger 1978-99 non-compliance dataset. It has very similar properties (cf. Graph 4, left versus right): Italy, 
Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and France are the usual suspects forming the group of compliance laggards, 
while Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the UK infringed only relatively few of the 1993 EU 
Directives.13 Therefore, it should be possible to draw inference about legal act-specific causes of non-
compliance from the sample for the universe of infringement cases in the European Union.
Graph 4: Infringements on 1993 Directives versus Average Annual Infringements14
13 The data also shows that if compliance leaders infringe on a Directive, they do so only once. Some of the laggards, 
by contrast, infringe on the same Directives several times. For instance, the Commission has initiated infringe-
ment proceedings for infringements on Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public works contracts against France five times since 1993. Therefore, Belgium, France, and 
Greece can call exactly as many infringements their own as Italy (44 to be precise), which leads the pack in 
terms of number of legal acts infringed on. However, it should also be noted that ¾ of the 118 EU Directives 
passed in 1993 have never been infringed on by any member state and only one Directive – Council Direc-
tive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts – has been infringed on by more than ten EU members.
14 The graph on the left shows the number of the 118 EU Directives that came into force in 1993 that each of 
the EU 12 member states infringed on between 1993 and 1999. The graph on the right depicts the average 
annual number of infringements of all European legal acts per EU 12 member state in the years 1986-1999.
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Looking at our data from a policy sector- instead of a member state-perspective (Graph 5), we can see 
that there is substantial variation in the probability with which 1993 EU Directives from the eight covered 
policy sectors are infringed on. Doing so, we control for the number of Directives that came into force 
in these policy sectors in 1993 because this constitutes the number of Directives that member states 
can potentially infringe on. While there are 46 Directives that deal with agricultural issues and 36 that 
are concerned with the European market, only two new Directives address competition. The average 
member state infringes on more than one out of every three enterprise, social affairs, and tax Directives. 
Contrariwise, most member states comply with competition Directives most of the time.
Graph 5: Reasoned Opinion per 1993 EU Directive (in %) by Average Member State
How can we explain that only some of these 118 Directives are infringed on? What makes the ones that 
are violated different from those that are complied with? Also, why do some member states infringe on 
some of these Directives while others do not? To answer these questions, we take a closer look at three 
interrelated concepts – misfit, complexity, and time – and derive several testable hypotheses, mainly from 
implementation and Europeanization approaches, the management school, enforcement theory, and a 
relatively new literature that also tries to analyze the effects of rule specific variables in the context of 
transposition (delays).15 
First, taking the individual legal act as the unit of analysis, we can actually analyze the effects of the fit 
of European rules on their chances to be infringed on. As is one of the most basic assumptions in non-
compliance research, “inconvenient” rules can facilitate violations, since only they require states to invest 
resources, which they might be unwilling (Downs et al. 1996; Martin 1992) or unable to do (Chayes/
15 Cf. Steunenberg 2007; Haverland et al. 2008; and Steunenberg/Kaeding 2008. 
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Chayes 1993). Rules that resemble already existing standards, political, or societal institutions, problem 
solving approaches, or collective identities do not require (major) investments of financial, administrative, 
political, or cognitive resources (Börzel 2005; Héritier et al. 2001). Hence it is less likely that states oppose 
them and non-compliance should be relatively low. As new European rules can resemble existing European 
legislation, national legislation, or both, we can specify two distinct misfit hypotheses.
Table 7: Misfit Hypotheses
European Misfit Domestic Misfit
The higher the misfit between existing and new 
European norms, the more probable are infringements.
The higher the misfit between new European and 
existing domestic norms, the more probable are 
infringements.
To test the first misfit hypothesis, we analyze – in line with Mastenbroek 2003, Kaeding 2006, and 
Haverland/Romeijn 2007 – whether the number of existing European legal acts, on which the new Directive 
is based upon, has a negative impact on the probability that the new Directive is infringed on. Neither the 
hypothesis nor the independent variable distinguishes between the member states as the European misfit 
is the same for all countries. This is not the case for domestic misfit. New European legislation can be 
more in line with existing national legislation in one member state than in another. We operationalize the 
domestic misfit with the number of transposition instruments that specific member states (need to) use 
to transpose and implement European Directives. The assumption behind this operationalization is that 
the lower the number of reported transposition measures, the lower the misfit between the European 
Directive and existing domestic norms. Therefore, we expect that with more transposition measures, it 
becomes more likely that a member state infringes on EU law.16
Second, management and enforcement approaches expect that the complexity of new European 
Directives should affect their chances of being infringed on. The management school on non-compliance 
assumes that infringements are involuntary (Chayes/Chayes 1991, 1995). Even if states like to comply with 
a European rule, they are prevented from doing so if the very preconditions that enable states to comply 
are absent. One source of non-compliance is complex norms. Unclear obligations can facilitate involuntary 
non-compliance by member states simply because states base their behavior on wrong interpretations 
of what the norm is about and where it should be applied. High complexity of norms is also related 
to capacity requirements. Complex Directives also require more political, administrative, financial, and 
cognitive capacities than precise ones, thereby facilitating the occurrence of non-compliance. Thus, the 
management approach expects that more complex legislation stands a better chance of being violated.
The enforcement approach assumes that states as strategic rational actors violate norms if non-compliance 
costs exceed benefits (Downs 1998; Downs et al. 1996). Compared to ambivalent norms, highly precise 
Directives hardly leave margins for states to choose cost-saving interpretations for their transposition and 
16 For a related operationalization of domestic misfit in the context of a study on transposition of directives in the 
Netherlands (cf. Mastenbroek 2003). Kaeding (2006) is also interested in domestic misfit. However, rather than 
looking at the “technical” fit, he uses the number of recitals as an indicator for member states’ explicit dissatis-
faction with an European Directive or the potential domestic controversies that the transpositions of the Direc-
tive might lead to. 
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implementation. Thus, cost-benefit calculations more likely point towards non-compliance for the former. 
Also, as highly precise norms restrict the margins for potential compromises between the member state 
and the European institutions (Hucke 1980; Feick 1980; Windhoff-Héritier 1980), high precision increases 
the chances that a norm is violated. 
Table 8: Complexity and Precision Hypotheses
Managerial Approach to Complexity Enforcement Approach to Precision
The higher the complexity of new European norms, the 
more probable it is that it is infringed on.
The higher the precision of new European norms, the 
more probable it is that it is infringed on.
How do we operationalize the complexity and the precision of European Directives? Unfortunately, there 
are not two perfectly matching indicators. We use three different indicators for the measurement of 
complexity: The number of legal acts a new Directive cites, the number of existing acts it changes, and 
its length in terms of words.17 All three of these variables are hypothesized to be positively related to 
complexity and therefore the probability of non-compliance according to the management approach. 
Precision is a tricky concept as well. We operationalize it with two indicators: the number of existing acts 
a new Directive changes and the Directive’s length in terms of words. Based on the enforcement approach, 
we expect that high precision fosters non-compliance.
In the managerial perspective, inadequate timetables, up to which compliance has to be achieved, are an 
important source of involuntary non-compliance (Chayes/Chayes 1991, 1995). EU member states need 
time to actually transpose, implement, and enforce Directives. If member states do not receive sufficient 
time, non-compliance seems unavoidable (cf. Mastenbroek 2003; Steunenberg/Rhinard 2005; Kaeding 
2006; Haverland et al. 2008). Domestic bureaucracies might simply not (yet) be qualified to implement 
and enforce new and challenging legislation. There is a second aspect to time. Not only does it matter 
for the probability of non-compliance how much time member states receive to transpose new EU 
Directives, but also how much time they take. The longer member states wait to transpose and implement 
European legislation (beyond the transposition deadline), the higher the chance that they are caught 
by the Commission and that the Commission presses charges against them, i.e. initiates infringement 
proceedings.18
17 Some studies also use the number of articles and the length of annexes as indicators for the complexity of Eu-
ropean legal acts. Interestingly, while the length of Directive in words and the number of its articles are usually 
associated with higher complexity, extensive annexes are usually thought to detail the technical aspects of new 
legislation, making it easier to transpose and more straightforward to apply (cf. Steunenberg/Kaeding 2008). 
18 Most of the previously cited literature on the transposition of European Directives treats this second aspect of 
time not as a covariate, but as the dependent variable itself. While we are interested in documented instances of 
non-compliance in this paper, (Mastenbroek 2003, Haverland et al. 2008, Steunenberg/Kaeding 2008, and others 
analyze the time it takes to transpose Directives (beyond the official transposition deadline) – and whether the 
Commission considers a member state to be violating European law or not. 
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Table 9: Time Hypotheses
Transposition Timetables Rule-specific Idling
The more time member states are granted to transpose 
European norms, the less probable are infringements.
The longer member states take to transpose new 
European norms, the more probable it is that the 
Commission initiates infringement proceedings/that 
infringements are detected.
To empirically test the effects of time received and time taken, we analyze the effects of the number of days 
between the passing of new European Directives and their transposition deadline on non-compliance, on 
the one hand, and the number of days between the deadline and the date of the last reported transposition 
instrument, on the other hand. 
Empirical Findings
Now, let us turn to our analysis, where we use probit models, to test whether our rule-specific covariates 
have a significant effect on the probability that an EU Directive passed in 1993 is infringed on by a member 
state, as well as count data models. The unit of analysis is the member state-Directive. The binary dependent 
variable for our probit analysis measures whether an infringement occurred for a unit between 1993 and 
1999. The dependent variable for the count data analysis measures how often a specific member state 
infringes on a specific Directive. 
Table 10: Misfit, Complexity, Time, and Infringements
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Count Probit Count
Misfit:
Previous EU Acts -0.1785***
0.0633
-0.1381
0.0872
-0.1133**
0.0498
-0.0902
0.0748
National Instruments -0.0281
0.0216
-0.0292
0.0235
0.0123
0.0132
0.0132
0.0130
Complexity/ Precision:
Acts Cited 0.0037
0.0160
0.0175
0.0191
0.0408***
0.0129
0.0575***
0.0155
Acts Changed 0.0336
0.0260
0.0278
0.0312
0.0374**
0.0181
0.0489**
0.0204
Words 0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Time:
Deadline 0.0004*
0.0002
0.0003
0.0003
0.0003*
0.0002
0.0004
0.0002
Idleness 0.0009***
0.0001
0.0008***
0.0001
Constant -1.1322***
0.1206
-1.8720***
0.1613
-0.9282***
0.1031
-1.7657***
0.1514
Policy Dummies
Observations 1079 1079 1320 1320
Pseudo R-squared 0.1824 0.1072 0.0216 0.0189
Regressions with two-tailed t-tests and robust (Hubert/White) standard errors. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
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Table 10 shows that there is some empirical support for at least three of our rule-specific hypotheses. 
There is clear evidence that, when new Directives are based on existing European legislation, the misfit 
for member states is kept to a minimum and the probability of one (Probit Models 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 of 
Table 10) or several (count data Models 6 and 10 of Table 10) infringements becomes smaller. However, 
the second misfit hypothesis on the effects of a domestic legal misfit is not supported by our data. This 
might be more due to our data than anything else as the operationalization of domestic misfit via the 
number of national transposition instruments is very indirect. In fact, if we specify the domestic misfit 
hypothesis in an even more detailed fashion by including interaction effects with our two main capacity 
indicators for government autonomy and capacity (Models 9-12 of Table 10) (cf. Börzel et al. 2010), our 
findings imply that with an increasing number of domestic veto players the probability that misfit leads to 
non-compliance is actually reduced.
Table 10: Misfit, Complexity, Time, and Infringements (continued)
Models: (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probit Count Probit Count
Misfit:
Previous EU Acts -0.1797***
(0.0641)
-0.1454*
(0.0803)
-0.2266**
(0.0923)
-0.1690
(0.1099)
National Instruments -0.0086
(0.0181)
-0.0087
(0.0171)
-0.0021
(0.0177)
-0.0005
(0.0158)
Complexity/ Precision:
Acts Cited 0.0075
(0.0160)
0.0267
(0.0168)
0.0103
(0.0192)
0.0263
(0.0189)
Acts Changed 0.0353
(0.0271)
0.0270
(0.0292)
0.0344
(0.0289)
0.0184
(0.0312)
Words 0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000*
(0.0000)
0.0000*
(0.0000)
Time:
Deadline 0.0004*
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.0002)
0.0004*
(0.0003)
0.0003
(0.0003)
Idleness 0.0009***
(0.0001)
0.0007***
(0.0001)
0.0009***
(0.0001)
0.0007***
(0.0001)
Power: 
GDP 0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
SSI 0.0655*
(0.0369)
0.0975*
(0.0512)
0.0699*
(0.0383)
0.1026**
(0.0508)
Capacity:
GDPpc -0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.0000
(0.0000)
Efficiency -0.4601***
(0.1151)
-0.7648***
(0.1860)
-0.4976***
(0.1235)
-0.7782***
(0.1827)
Constraints 0.8333
(0.5483)
0.8824
(0.6143)
0.8947
(0.5508)
0.9352
(0.6091)
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SSI * Efficiency 0.0387
(0.0246)
0.0819**
(0.0390)
0.0416
(0.0263)
0.0828**
(0.0384)
Constant -1.4996***
(0.1581)
-2.5399***
(0.2273)
-0.9823*
(0.5868)
-2.0174***
(0.4810)
Policy Dummies no no yes yes
Observations 1079 1079 1067 1079
Pseudo R-squared 0.2230 0.1436 0.2405 0.1585
At least in half of the estimated models in Table 10 (3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12), we find support for the 
managerial complexity argument, i.e. more complex new EU Directives are more likely to be infringed on. 
The enforcement precision hypothesis finds no support, since the length of Directives is not significant 
at all (with Models 7 and 8 as the only exceptions in Table 10) and because the correlation between 
the numbers of cited legal acts and non-compliance points into the wrong direction in basically all 
models. Finally, idleness in the transposition of Directives significantly increases the probability that the 
Commission initiates one or more infringement proceedings against the respective state. This is by far the 
most consistent finding of our rule-specific analyses. Also consistent, but far more surprising, is the finding 
that time matters other than expected when it comes to the time that member states receive after the 
passing of new legislation to actually transpose, implement, and enforce it domestically. Counter to one 
of the basic assumptions of the management approach and our first time hypothesis, lax transposition 
deadlines actually increase the probability that compliance problems occur.
In Models 5-12 of Table 10, we control for member state and policy variables. It is interesting to notice that, 
on the one hand, the idleness and European level misfit hypotheses are not affected by the inclusion of 
these control variables. That is, the effects of the number of acts new Directives are based on and the time 
member states take to transpose these Directives are robust. On the other hand, it is also reassuring to 
see that two main country-centered covariates – political power and bureaucratic efficiency, which explain 
the occurrence of non-compliance across member states in the whole dataset (Börzel et al. 2010) – are 
correctly and significantly correlated with the probability of infringements. This shows again that the data 
on infringements on 1993 EU Directives is a suitable subset of the universe of infringements on EU law 
between 1978 and 1999.
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Table 10: Misfit, Complexity, Time, and Infringements (continued)
Models: (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probit Count Probit Count
Misfit:
Previous EU Acts -0.1820***
(0.0648)
-0.1461*
(0.0774)
-0.1178**
(0.0513)
-0.0949
(0.0703)
National Instruments -0.0166
(0.0250)
-0.0011
(0.0226)
0.0249
(0.0264)
0.0130
(0.0202)
Interaction Effects:
Nat. Instruments * 
Efficiency
0.0397
(0.0312)
0.0485
(0.0328)
0.0188
(0.0291)
0.0082
(0.0292)
Nat. Instruments * 
Constraints
-0.7432**
(0.3118)
-0.5385*
(0.2789)
-0.3792**
(0.1751)
-0.3693*
(0.1909)
Complexity/ 
Precision:
Acts Cited 0.0101
(0.0162)
0.0277
(0.0170)
0.0441***
(0.0132)
0.0596***
(0.0147)
Acts Changed 0.0412
(0.0287)
0.0266
(0.0306)
0.0415**
(0.0194)
0.0487**
(0.0208)
Words 0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
Time:
Deadline 0.0005*
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.0002)
0.0003*
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
Idleness 0.0009***
(0.0001)
0.0008***
(0.0001)
Power: 
GDP 0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
SSI 0.0541
(0.0380)
0.0877*
(0.0509)
0.0605*
(0.0325)
0.1104**
(0.0537)
Capacity:
GDPpc -0.0000*
(0.0000)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
-0.0000*
(0.0000)
Efficiency -0.4684***
(0.1221)
-0.7916***
(0.1850)
-0.5801***
(0.1047)
-1.0017***
(0.2050)
Constraints 1.0212*
(0.5365)
1.1583**
(0.5841)
0.9290**
(0.4671)
1.1121*
(0.5830)
Interaction Effects:
SSI * Efficiency 0.0334
(0.0252)
0.0802**
(0.0381)
0.0494**
(0.0225)
0.1083**
(0.0442)
Constant -1.5731***
(0.1652)
-2.6130***
(0.2242)
-1.3380***
(0.1393)
-2.5249***
(0.2318)
Observations 1079 1079 1320 1320
Pseudo R-squared 0.2332 0.1489 0.09452 0.07544
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Overall, what makes table 10 interesting beyond the findings for individual hypotheses is that it shows that 
non-compliance is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that can fruitfully and simultaneously be addressed 
from a policy, country, and legal act perspective. Even when we test hypotheses about the effects of 
member state power and capacity, Directive characteristics, and policy dummies together in one model, 
we find support for hypotheses from each of these perspectives. This gives paramount support to an 
integrative approach, which integrates country-, policy-, and rule-specific variables.
5.  Conclusions
Due to its IR legacy, compliance theories mainly focus on country-based explanations for the occurrence 
and persistence of non-compliance. In our previous work, we could show that an integrated capacity and 
power model explains a large share of the observed variation in compliance dynamics (Börzel et al. 2010). 
Yet, some variation has remained unexplained so far. This paper advances the claim that it is worthwhile 
to move beyond state-centered approaches and to policy- and rule-specific variables. To this end, we 
mapped the frequency of non-compliance and its persistence across policy fields. This reveals that some 
policies are more often violated than others (especially those from the enterprise sector, justice and home 
affairs, and environment policy fields) and that some violations require more time and more stages of the 
infringement procedures until they are settled (especially those from the fisheries, administration, and 
taxation policy fields). But, how exactly can policy make a difference with respect to the frequency of 
violations and the transformation of states’ non-compliance into compliance? In section 3, we develop 
hypotheses based on diverse theoretical approaches, such as research on domestic implementation, 
compliance, and international cooperation. The quantitative tests of these hypotheses reveal that 
neither broad categories of different policy types (i.e. regulative, distributive, and redistributive), nor 
the distinction between market-creating and market-correcting policies can conclusively account for the 
empirical variation in non-compliance that we observe. The main reason for that has to be the almost 
irreconcilable difficulties that come with trying to code policy fields along the identified policy dimensions. 
For instance, most policy fields entail positive and negative integration elements as well as regulative 
aspects. In addition, regulative legal acts can have redistributive side-effects. We decided to climb down on 
the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970) and focus on rule-specific variables rather than the characteristics 
of whole policy fields. To this end and based on and modifying existing Europeanization, implementation, 
management, and enforcement approaches, we develop hypotheses on national and European misfit, the 
complexity and precision of new norms, transposition timetables, and idling in section 4 of this paper. To 
test these hypotheses, we introduced a dataset, which contains all Directives that entered into force in 
1993. This dataset does not only allow us to measure compliance and non-compliance for individual EU 
Directives, but to code Directives’ individual, rule-specific characteristics as well. When testing our rule-
specific hypotheses, it turns out that the managerial complexity of Directives goes hand in hand with a 
higher share of non-compliance. Also, when new Directives are based on existing European legislation, 
the misfit for member states is kept to a minimum and the probability of infringements is small. Last, but 
not least, idleness in the transposition of Directives increases the chance that the Commission opens 
infringement procedures against the indolent member state. 
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This paper demonstrates that explanations focusing on country-, policy-, and rule specific-characteristics 
can be fruitfully combined. Testing our hypotheses on the effects of member state power and capacity, 
rule-specific variables, and policy dummies in a single model, we found support for each of these 
perspectives: Countries with high power (to be recalcitrant) are more likely to violate EU law than less 
powerful ones across the board. Countries with effective bureaucracies are better compliers than those 
that lack capacities no matter what legal act they have to transpose, implement, and enforce (cf. Börzel 
et al. 2010). At the same time, our analysis shows that all member states violate complex rules and 
legislation in market-correcting policy fields more often than precise ones and those from policy sectors 
characterized by negative integration. Also, all member states infringe on new EU legal acts more often if 
the European misfit is high. Thus, this paper gives paramount support to an integrative approach, which 
combines independent variables that cover the differences between countries, policy sectors, and specific 
rules.
Building upon this integrated approach, there remain at least two challenges for future empirical research. 
First, we pointed to the difficulties of properly testing the hypotheses developed in section 3 of this 
paper. The legal acts that form part of European policy sectors are very heterogeneous and complicate 
the categorization of different sectors as either regulative, distributive, redistribute, market-making, or 
market-correcting. A logical next step would be to take these meaningful concepts down to the level of the 
legal act and to code individual European articles, regulations, directives, and decisions along these policy 
dimensions. While this is certainly feasible, it is a daunting task, given the more than 10,000 European legal 
acts in force. The second challenge for future research is not about time and effort, but methodological. 
How can we test rule-specific hypotheses for our second dependent variable, i.e. the persistence of non-
compliance over time and over the different stages of the infringement procedure? As we pointed out, this 
requires two-stage selection models that can combine probit and count data models on the one hand with 
survival and ordered probit models on the other in order to account for the non-random sample selection 
that affects the explanation of why some infringements of certain European legal acts are harder to settle 
than others and why it takes longer and more stages of the EU infringement procedure to overcome non-
compliance in some cases than in others.
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Appendix: Operationalization of Power and Capacity
In order to test the influence of power, we incorporate two power indicators into our analysis. These 
indicators are widely used in the literature and account for different aspects of power – economic size and 
EU-specific political power. Gross domestic product (GDP) is our proxy for economic power (Keohane 1989; 
Martin 1992; Moravcsik 1998; Steinberg 2002). The data come from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2005). For direct EU-specific political power, we use the proportion of times when a member 
state is pivotal (and can, thus, turn a losing into a winning coalition) under qualified majority voting (QMV) 
in the Council of Ministers (Shapley Shubik Index) as an indicator (Shapley/Shubik 1954; Rodden 2002). 
As discussed in the context of our hypotheses, capacity can be subdivided into two specific concepts – 
government autonomy and government capacity. Government autonomy is a function of the number of 
veto players in the political system of a member state (Tsebelis 2002; Immergut 1998). However, even 
if the number of the institutional and partisan veto players remains constant over time, the interests of 
these actors – for example regarding (non-) compliance – may change. We use an alternative veto player 
index (Constraints), which allows for the interests of veto players in such a way that interdependences 
between veto players and the respective political system are taken into consideration (Henisz 2002). It 
is based on a simple spatial model of political interaction among government branches, measuring the 
number of independent branches with veto power and the distribution of political preferences across 
these branches. They can be interpreted as a measure of institutional constraints that either preclude 
arbitrary changes of existing policies or produce gridlock and so undermine the ability of the government 
to change policies when such change is needed.19 Two alternative indicators of government autonomy are 
discussed in the literature: The executive control of the parliamentary agenda measured by the extent to 
which the government can successfully initiate drafts and rely on stable majorities for in the legislative 
branch (Döring 1995; Tsebelis 2002), and the parliamentary oversight of government measured by the 
material (e.g. number of committees) and ideational resources (e.g. information processing capacity) 
relevant for the oversight of the legislative on the government (Harfst/Schnapp 2003). We do not include 
these two variables, because of multicollinearity concerns.
To test for the influence of government capacity, we include two indicators that are prominent in the 
literature. First of all, we incorporate GDP per capita (Brautigam 1996). It is a general measure for the 
resources on which a state can draw to ensure compliance. The data come from the Word Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2005). Whether a state has the capacity to mobilize these resources shall be 
captured by the variable bureaucratic Efficiency. In the operationalization, we use an index of bureaucratic 
efficiency and professionalism of the public service based on work by Auer and her colleagues (Mbaye 
2001; Auer et al. 1996). This index consists of three components of bureaucratic efficiency: Performance 
related pay for civil servants, lack of permanent tenure, and public advertising of open positions. 
Bureaucratic efficiency highly correlates with measures of corruption, e.g. the Corruption Perception 
Index of Transparency International (Herzfeld/Weiss 2003). For issues of multicollinearity, we include 
only bureaucratic efficiency in our analysis. Other potential indicators of government capacity – such as 
19 Some scholars argue that political variables, such as partisan preferences of the governments in power, can 
explain variation in compliance with EU law (e.g. Mastenbroek 2005). This explanatory variable can be operatio-
nalized with the frequency of government changes. However, if partisan preferences do matter, it is more likely 
that they account for variation in compliance between specific policies than for variation between countries. 
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bureaucratic quality from the International Country Risk Guide and the World Bank governance indicators 
(Kaufmann et al. 2006) – are not used due to the fact that they cover only part of the time period analyzed 
in this paper and lack sufficient variance for comparative studies of the EU member states.
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